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NEWTON v. NBC: FIRST AMENDMENT BIG WINNER IN
PUBLIC FIGURE DEFAMATION ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court defines public figures in part as
"[tihose who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements. . . seek
the public's attention,"' and therefore, "have voluntarily exposed them-
selves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning
them."2 As a result, courts have reviewed public figures' allegations of
defamation with greater scrutiny than they have the claims of private
individuals.' Despite an apparent trend to reduce the first amendment's
scope of protection,4 the courts have consistently given greater protection
to the right of free speech than they have given to the opposing interest of
defending the reputations of public figures. Arguably, the judiciary's in-
terest in insuring the media's ability to write and publish free of risk has
emasculated to some degree the seventh amendment guarantee of defer-
ence to the factfinding role of the jury.
Defamation, which comprises the twin torts of libel and slander,5 is
best defined as a communication which "tends so to harm the reputation
of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter
third persons from associating or dealing with him."6 Consistent with
the general principle of tort law that remedies are to be liberally pro-
1. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
2. Id at 345.
3. The term private individual will hereinafter refer to persons who are not public figures.
4. Many recent events indicate that the country may be leaning towards a more conserva-
tive and orthodox future. These include the controversy over the obscene lyrics of recording
group the 2 Live Crew, see R. Corliss, X-Rated, TIME, May 7, 1990, at 92-99; the public
uproar concerning a Cincinnati art museum's display of Robert Mapplethorpe's art, see D.
Gates, The Mapplethorpe Furor Erupts Again, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 9, 1990, at 72; the Right to
Life movement and other anti-abortion campaigns, see L.A. Times, Apr. 15, 1990, at AI, col.
2; and the refusal of the Motion Picture Ass'n of America to create a new film rating for
"Adult" movies, see R. Corliss, X-Movies, TIME, May 7, 1990, at 97.
5. W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 111, at 771 (5th ed. 1984). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977):
(1) Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter by written or printed
words, by its embodiment in physical form or by any other form of communication
which has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words.
(2) Slander consists of the publication of defamatory matter by spoken words, tran-
sitory gestures or by any form of communication other than those stated in Subsec-
tion (1).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
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vided,7 the traditional plaintiff only needs to satisfy three requirements to
establish a prima facie case for defamation: that the defendant (1) com-
municated to a third person a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of
and concerning the plaintiff.8
Public figures, however, must meet a higher standard of proof. As
opposed to private individuals, who tend to their own personal affairs,
public figures seek the public's attention,9 and are consequently not as
deserving of recovery. 10 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ("New York
Times"),1" the Supreme Court held that public officials12 must show that
a defamatory statement was "made with 'actual malice' - that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.""3 Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. 14 ("Newton"),
which reverses a Las Vegas, Nevada jury's libel damage award to singer
Wayne Newton, 15 demonstrates the difficulty that a public figure such as
Newton faces in trying to prove defamation under the heightened stan-
dard of New York Times. This Note briefly traces the development of the
public figure standard in defamation law and analyzes the recent decision
in Newton, concluding that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly
reversed the lower court's decision by applying the rigorous scrutiny
compelled by New York Times.
II. EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC FIGURE DEFAMATION AFTER NEW YORK
TIME" THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD AND THE
REQUIREMENT OF INDEPENDENT APPELLATE
REVIEW
A. The Definition of "Actual Malice"
Three years after its landmark decision in New York Times, the
Supreme Court held that
the New York Times test should apply to criticism of "public
7. Note, The Art of Insinuation: Defamation by Implication, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 677,
678 n.lI (1990).
8. W. KEaTON, supra note 5, § 113 at 797, 802.
9. Gertz; 418 U.S. at 342.
10. Id. at 345.
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
12. A public official is a type of public figure. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
13. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-280.
14. 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 (9th Cir. 1990). The opinion was initially assigned the
citation of 913 F.2d 652. By the time volume 913 of the Federal Reporter, Second Series was
published, the opinion had been withdrawn. As a result, subsequent references to this case will
be designated by its LEXIS citation. The reason for the appellate decision's withdrawal is
addressed infra in part VI.
15. Newton v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1066 (D. Nev. 1987).
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figures" as well as "public officials," [and it therefore] extended
the constitutional privilege announced in that case to protect
defamatory criticism of non-official public figures who "... by
reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society
at large."16
Specifically, New York Times precludes a public official from recov-
ering damages for a defamatory statement concerning his official conduct
unless he shows that the statement was made with knowledge of its fal-
sity or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 7 Yet a "reckless disre-
gard" for the truth has been deemed a subjective standard and "requires
more than a departure from reasonably prudent conduct." 8 The Court
has held that evidence must exist sufficient to suggest that the public
defamation defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of his publication," 9 or had a "high degree of awareness of... probable
falsity."2° Consequently, failure to investigate before publishing, even
when reasonably prudent to do so, is not sufficient to establish reckless
disregard.2" On the other hand, recklessness may arise where there are
obvious grounds to question a source's information.22
B. Appellate Court's Duty of Independent Review
Generally, in non-first amendment cases appellate courts must defer
to the factual findings of a jury unless those findings are clearly errone-
ous.23 In first amendment cases, however, jury conclusions receive more
scrutiny. New York Times mandated that in public official defamation
cases, reviewing courts must independently examine the entire trial rec-
ord to ascertain that jury findings of actual malice do not encroach upon
the kind of speech protected by the first amendment.2 4 In particular the
Court sought to give substance to the promises of the first amendment by
extending to the media the right to freely disseminate information and
ideas, including the privilege to criticize the government.25  Conse-
quently, the Court required that public officials prove actual malice with
16. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 336-337 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162,
164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)).
17. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-280.
18. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2696 (1989).
19. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
20. Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)).
21. See Harte-Hanks, 109 S. Ct. at 2696; St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.
22. Harte-Hanks, 109 S. Ct. at 2696 (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
24. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229, 235 (1963)).
25. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
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convincing clarity,2 6 a touchstone consistently applied in other cases.
In St. Amant v. Thompson ("St. Amant"),2" the Court employed the
New York Times standard to reverse a damage award to a county law
enforcement officer.28 In a ruling which preceded the New York Times
decision, the trial judge in St. Amant found that in a televised speech a
local politician falsely charged a Louisiana deputy sheriff with criminal
conduct.2 9 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, hold-
ing that the deputy failed to show the politician was aware of the prob-
able falsity of his statement.3 °
Six years later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ("Gertz "),3 1 the
Supreme Court held the New York Times standard inapplicable to the
libel suit of a private individual32 but nevertheless asserted the standard's
important role regarding public figures. The case arose when Robert
Welch, Inc., the publisher of an ultra conservative magazine, printed an
article which denounced attorney Elmer Gertz as a "Communist-
fronter."' 33 Although Gertz was an accomplished lawyer, the Court
found that he had not attained widespread public acclaim.3 4 The Court
held that without clear evidence of general community recognition and
significant community involvement, a person could not be considered a
public figure.3 5
The Gertz Court thus provided a working definition for a public fig-
ure. 36 More importantly, however, the Court emphasized the precision
with which a public figure must demonstrate actual malice. As a result,
Gertz furnished the description of the New York Times standard which
has been most commonly used in other cases: to prevail in an action for
defamation a public figure must prove actual malice by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. a7
More recently, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States
38
("Bose") reiterated the New York Times rule in distinguishing between
26. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-286.
27. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
28. Id. at 731-733.
29. Id. at 728-729.
30. Id. at 732-733.
31. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
32. Id. at 352.
33. Id. at 326.
34. Id. at 351-352.
35. Id. at 352.
36. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-345. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
37. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 (emphasis added).
38. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
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proof of actual malice and proof of mere falsity. 39 In the case Bose con-
tended that the comment in Consumers Union's monthly magazine that
"individual instruments heard through the Bose [loudspeaker] system...
tended to wander about the room"'  was a "'false' statement of
'fact.' "4 The Court held that the defendant's choice of words did not
manifest clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.42 The alleged
inaccuracy of the comment notwithstanding, the fact that Consumers
Union refused to admit any error failed to support the notion that it was
aware of the inaccuracy when the magazine was published.43
Finally, in deciding Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Con-
naughton ("Harte-Hanks"),4 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and
United States Supreme Court both required a candidate for a Hamilton,
Ohio municipal judgeship to provide clear and convincing evidence of
actual malice in his libel suit against a local newspaper. 45 The newspa-
per, published by Harte-Hanks Communications, ran a story which
quoted grand jury witness Alice Thompson as saying that during the
campaign, Connaughton had used "dirty tricks" to induce her and her
sister to testify against one of the incumbent's agents." The jury agreed
with Connaughton's claim that the article was false and found that it was
published with actual malice.47 After independently reviewing the entire
trial record, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the lower court's
judgment did not contravene first amendment rights of free expression.48
In its own independent review, the Supreme Court ruled that the news-
paper's reasons for failing to interview Thompson's sister, a key grand
jury witness, were not credible.49 As a result, the Court held that:
it is likely that the newspaper's inaction was a product of a de-
liberate decision not to acquire knowledge of facts that might
confirm the probable falsity of Thompson's [testimony].
Although failure to investigate will not alone support a finding
of actual malice, the purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a
different category.50
39. Id at 511 n.30.
40. Id at 488.
41. Id at 490.
42. Id at 512.
43. Bose, 466 U.S. at 512.
44. 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989).
45. Harte-Hanks, 109 S. Ct. at 2697; 842 F.2d 825, 847 (6th Cir. 1988).
46. Harte-Hanks 109 S. Ct. at 2682.
47. Id
48. Id. (quoting Harte-Hanks. 842 F.2d at 828).
49. Id at 2698.
50. Id (citation omitted and emphasis added).
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The clear and convincing burden of proof required by New York
Times in public figure defamation cases calls for more exacting eviden-
tiary findings than does the preponderance of evidence standard usually
applied in civil lawsuits.51 This heightened standard illustrates the
court's desire to create an environment where ideas are freely dissemi-
nated and open debate is encouraged. Accordingly, by employing the
clear and convincing requirement in Newton, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals explicitly underscored the esteem with which it held the
promises of the first amendment.
III. BACKGROUND OF NEWTON V. NATIONAL BROADCASTING CO.,
INC
On October 6, 1980, National Broadcasting Company, Inc.
("NBC") televised a three-and-one-half minute report called "Wayne
Newton and the Law" on the NBC Nightly News. In addressing
Newton's relationship with certain Mafia figures, the newscast related
that Newton's purchase of the Aladdin hotel-casino in Las Vegas was
under investigation due to federal authorities' suspicions that the mob
had acquired a hidden interest in the Aladdin after assisting Newton
with an "unspecified problem." 2
Wayne Newton is one of Las Vegas' top performers, commanding
up to $250,000 a week for his nightclub act.53 In late November, 1980,
Nevada's State Gaming Board approved the bid of Newton and a partner
to purchase the Aladdin Hotel for $85 million. 54 According to NBC, a
federal grand jury was looking into the Aladdin deal because of questions
surrounding Newton's financial health. 5  Apparently, some time before
Newton revealed his intention to buy the Aladdin, Newton ran into a
problem for which he enlisted the assistance of Guido Penosi, a long-time
criminal with ties to the Gambino Mafia family.56 Whatever the problem
was, NBC declared that "it was important enough for Penosi to take it
up with the Gambino family in New York."57 Police said that Penosi's
mob boss, Frank Piccolo, "told associates that he had taken care of
Newton's problem and had become a hidden partner in the Aladdin hotel
51. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 15 n.9.
52. L.A. Times, Aug. 31, 1990, at A35, col. 2.
53. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 3 (quoting from transcript of NBC Nightly
News broadcast, Oct. 6, 1980).
54. Id. at 3-4.
55. Id. at 4.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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deal." 58
In addition, the broadcast conveyed that Newton had lied while
under oath. At his hearing with the State Gaming Board, Newton testi-
fied that he had no hidden partners, and although he knew Guido Penosi,
the two were merely friends.5 9 NBC reported that federal authorities
suspect that "Newton is not telling the whole story."'
Finally, the story disclosed that Penosi, in an interview with NBC,
denied knowing "anyone named Wayne Newton."6 Nevertheless, the
report explained that federal authorities were aware of at least eleven
phone calls Penosi made to Newton's house over a two-month period.6 2
The broadcast added that Penosi's relationship with Newton and other
entertainment figures was part of a large-scale Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation ("FBI") study of the role that East Coast mob money plays in the
entertainment business of Las Vegas and Hollywood.6 3
Newton, having watched the broadcast at home, "interpreted the
broadcast as saying he had received financing for [the Aladdin purchase]
through the mob," and recalled "being 'shocked' and 'devastated,'" un-
able to believe that " 'people could portray such a vicious lie.' "61 Six
months later, on April 10, 1981, Wayne Newton brought a defamation
action against NBC and three of its journalists 65 in Nevada's federal dis-
trict court in Las Vegas.
A. Facts of the Case
Specifically, Newton claimed that the October 6 broadcast, in addi-
tion to two subsequent broadcasts pertaining to the grand jury investiga-
tion, falsely conveyed the impression that the Mafia helped Newton buy
the Aladdin in exchange for a hidden share of the hotel-casino. 66 Fur-
thermore, the broadcast related that Newton, while under oath, misled
Nevada state gaming authorities about the nature of his association with
the Mafia. 67 NBC moved for summary judgment and a change of venue
from Las Vegas, the venue in which Newton had filed suit. Although
58. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 4.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 5.
62. Id
63. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 5.
64. Goldner, "Danke Schoen, " Las Vegas, THE AM. LAWYER, March 1987, at 73.
65. Brian Ross, the reporter; Ira Silverman, the field producer; and Paul Greenberg, the
executive producer. See Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 5.
66. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 5.
67. Id at 5-6.
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NBC established that its statements were either true or protected under
the common law privilege of fair reporting, 6 its motion for summary
judgment was denied on the ground that the jury could find that the
NBC broadcasts had left a defamatory impression about Newton. 69 The
district court also denied the motion for a change of venue.
In his jury instructions, the trial judge described the following im-
pressions possibly conveyed by the NBC broadcasts:
(1) Financing of Newton's purchase of the Aladdin was ob-
tained by and through Mafia and mob sources, and that
Newton holds a hidden ownership interest in the Aladdin for
the benefit of said Mafia and mob sources.
(2) Newton is associated with mobster Guido Penosi but has
not told Nevada gaming authorities the entire truth surround-
ing the relationship.
(3) While visually depicting Newton testifying under oath
before the Nevada State Gaming Board, NBC discussed the na-
ture of the testimony, indicating that federal authorities claim
Newton is not telling whole story.7°
The jury returned a special verdict, finding all four defendants liable for
defaming Newton.7' In particular, the jury found that certain statements
about Newton borne by the broadcasts were factual in nature and false.72
Moreover, the jury felt that the journalists "intended to convey a false or
defamatory impression about Newton with knowledge of falsity or seri-
ous subjective doubt about the truth of the impression. 7 3 As a result,
the "blue-collar jury,"74 which was composed of Newton's "adoring
hometown fans,"75 awarded the singer $19.3 million in compensatory
and punitive damages - the largest punitive award for defamation on
record.76
B. The District Court Decision
NBC moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in the
alternative for a new trial on the basis that Newton failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the broadcasts in question were aired
68. Id. at 7.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 6 n.2.
71. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 7.
72. Id. at 7.
73. Id at 7-8.
74. Goldner, supra note 64, at 75.
75. Id. at 73.
76. L.A. Times, Aug. 31, 1990, at A3, col. 2.
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with actual malice." In its review of the evidence, however, the district
court upheld the jury's verdict of liability, finding that the broadcast had
left the clear and inescapable impression that since Newton lacked the
money to buy the Aladdin Hotel, he called his friend Guido Penosi for
financial help.78 In exchange for his help, Penosi, who had ties to organ-
ized crime, obtained a hidden interest in the Aladdin Hotel."9
The district court further ruled that NBC knew this impression was
defamatory ° for a number of reasons. First, by accusing Newton of giv-
ing the Mafia a hidden interest in the Aladdin, NBC essentially charged
Newton with breaking the law, and such accusatory statements are de-
famatory.8 Second, defendants Ross and Silverman 2 had attended
Newton's hearing before the Nevada Gaming Board, where the Valley
Bank of Nevada established that it had provided money for Newton to
purchase the Aladdin. 3 Finally, testimony during the trial revealed that
Newton had called Penosi because of death threats to his daughter and
himself.8 4 Although defendants maintained that they did not intend for
the broadcasts to convey a defamatory impression, the district court
ruled that Newton demonstrated that the defendants had serious subjec-
tive doubts as to the truth of the broadcasts and could not therefore es-
cape liability.85
The district court also upheld the jury's awards of damages for pain
and suffering and punitive damages but sharply reduced the damages
awarded on other grounds. It set aside the $5 million awarded Newton
for damage to reputation, holding that the award shocked the conscience
of the court since the broadcasts did not taint Newton's reputation. 6
The district court also set aside the jury's award of $9,046,750 for
Newton's claims of lost past and future income, concluding that Newton
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the broadcasts
had any correlation to any alleged lost income.8 7 Lastly, the court held
that unless Newton filed a remittitur of all sums except $225,000 for
physical and mental injury, $50,000 as presumed damages to reputation,
and $5,000,000 in punitive damages, the court would order a new trial in
77. Newton, 677 F. Supp. at 1067.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. See generally W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 112, at 788-790.
82. See supra note 65.
83. Newton, 677 F. Supp. at 1067.
84. Id at 1068.
85. Id
86. Id.
87. Id at 1069.
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the Central District of California."8 Faced with the prospect of a new
trial outside of Las Vegas, Newton filed the remittitur. After final judg-
ment for $5.275 million was entered on February 10, 1989, NBC timely
appealed.
89
IV. THE APPEAL BEFORE THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
Although NBC raised a multitude of issues in its appeal,' the Ninth
Circuit found that the issue of actual malice disposed of the case in its
entirety and eliminated the need to address the other issues.91 During
the trial Newton strongly disputed his status as a public figure, but his
efforts failed to convince the district court.92 Consequently, by the time
the case reached the appellate level, Newton was basically forced to con-
cede that he is a public figure as the term is defined in Gertz As a result,
the first amendment would preclude recovery unless Newton produced
clear and convincing evidence that NBC and its journalists uttered a
false, defamatory statement about Newton with actual malice. 93
A. Determining the Appropriate Standard of Review
Compelled to independently examine the whole record, 94 the Ninth
Circuit contemplated the degree to which New York Times required it to
"depart from the special deference with which [it] would normally treat
each and every one of the jury's factual determinations." 91 Of particular
concern was the distinction between the New York Times standard and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which provides that "[flindings of
fact ... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
88. Newton, 677 F. Supp. at 1069.
89. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 10.
90. See id. at 11 n.5:
NBC questions whether liability for defamation based on a false impression, as op-
posed to a false statement, may be imposed without contravening the First Amend-
ment ... whether the district court impermissibly allowed the jury to determine
which statements in the broadcasts were ones of fact and not opinion.... [Finally,
NBC] challenges the district court's denial of its motion for a change of venue ...
including an attack on the law of [the] circuit regarding punitive damages in a First
Amendment case.
91. Id. at 11.
92. See id. at 11 n.6 ("The district court held Newton to be a public figure and imposed
sanctions of $55,000 on Newton for requiring his public figure status to be proved.").
93. Id at 11. See also New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
94. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229, 235 (1963)). See also supra text accompanying note 24.
95. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 14.
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of witnesses."96 Indeed, as the court noted, "the independent review
standard and the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) 'point in oppo-
site directions.' ,97
Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that New York Times clearly
mandated that in public figure defamation cases, an appellate court must
independently review the entire record to reassure itself that the lower
court's judgment did not manifest an intrusion on the field of free expres-
sion.98 Moreover, the court found that "[t]he requirement of independ-
ent appellate review .. .is a rule of federal constitutional law which
'reflects' a deeply held conviction that judges ...must exercise such
review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained
by the Constitution." 99 Consequently, the court ruled that whether the
evidentiary record clearly and convincingly establishes the actual malice
elements required to strip the utterance of first amendment protection is
not merely a question for the trier of fact."°° As a result, the appellate
court must take pains to secure the appropriate appellate protection of
first amendment values"°1 while simultaneously deferring to the findings
of the trier of fact.' 2 By finding that New York Times' rule of independ-
ent review assigns judges a constitutional duty which cannot be delegated
to the trier of fact," 3 the Ninth Circuit could accept all factual findings
of the district court and still rule as a matter of law that the record did
not contain the clear and convincing evidence necessary to justify the
lower court's ruling."
Despite the requirement of Rule 52(a) to defer to the jury's or trial
court's factual findings, the appellate court recognized that "the pre-
sumption of correctness that attaches to factual findings is stronger in
some cases than in others."'0 5 Accordingly, the court reasoned that jury
findings merit their greatest consideration when an appeal involves credi-
bility determinations because only the factfinder has the opportunity to
observe the witness. " 6 Nevertheless, the fragility of the first amendment
issues arising in Newton compelled the Ninth Circuit to be more discrimi-
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (emphasis added). See also Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS
15265 at 14.
97. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 14 (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 498).
98. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 15 (citing New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285).
99. Id. (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 510-511).
100. Id. at 15-16.
101. Id. at 16.
102. Id
103. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 17.
104. Id at 17-18.
105. Id. at 18 (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 500).
106. Id. (citing Harte-Hanks, 109 S. Ct. at 2696 (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 499-500)).
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nating in deferring to the findings of the trial court."°7 Consequently, the
court of appeals independently examined the entire factual record to as-
sure that the dispositive constitutional problems in Newton were properly
decided.'08
As to the limits which the clearly erroneous directive of Rule 52(a)
places on the appellate court's independent review of jury credibility de-
terminations, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the fundamental first
amendment values at issue in public figure defamation cases "mandated
heightened appellate review of actual malice determinations."'" In par-
ticular, the court considered the need to defend first amendment virtues
from the prejudices of a local jury against strangers: "Newton's case
poses the danger that first amendment values will be subverted by a local
jury biased in favor of a prominent local public figure against an alien
speaker who criticizes that local hero." 0 Although the risk of un-
checked favoritism of local juries usually factors into a decision about
venue rather than standard of review, the extent to which Newton is re-
vered in Las Vegas' I ' forced the Ninth Circuit to be especially protective
of the first amendment's fundamental liberties in its analysis on the
merits. "1
2
B. Applying the New York Times Standard
Overall, the Ninth Circuit found the facts of the case to be undis-
puted. The majority of evidence provided by the trial record concerned
the federal investigation into Newton's possible connection to the Ma-
fia.' '3 For the purposes of its review, the court of appeals arranged the
evidence into three categories: Newton's involvement with the Mafia,
Newton's testimony before Nevada state gaming authorities, and the fed-
eral investigation of the Gambino family's efforts to enter the Las Vegas
casino business." 4
107. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 18.
108. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 19 (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331, 335 (1946)). See also Harte-Hanks, 109 S. Ct. at 2695.
109. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 20.
110. Id at 20-21.
111. Las Vegas citizens celebrate Wayne Newton Day and have named a major boulevard
in his honor. In addition, Newton was named "Distinguished Citizen of the Year" in 1980 by
the Clark County Chapter of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, and at a Lincoln
Day dinner in his honor in 1981, Newton was named the "Republican Man of the Year" in the
state of Nevada. Id at 21 n. 15 and accompanying text.
112. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 22.
113. Id. at 25.
114. Id This Casenote will not address the third category ("the federal investigation of the
Gambino family's efforts to enter the Las Vegas casino business").
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1. The Evidentiary Record
a. Newton's Involvement With the Mafia
At trial, Newton's own testimony admitted that he and Penosi
maintained a friendly relationship. Newton had dined at Penosi's house
and even invited Penosi to his brother's wedding." 5 Newton had ar-
ranged for Penosi to visit his Las Vegas home on at least one occasion,
and he even performed on a television special without payment as a favor
for Penosi's son." 6 Of primary importance was the contact between the
two in 1980 when Newton, who was receiving death threats from mem-
bers of an organized crime syndicate, asked Penosi for help. Penosi re-
sponded by giving Newton the Connecticut phone number of Frank
Piccolo, his mob boss. '" FBI tapes recording phone conversations be-
tween Piccolo and Penosi establish that Piccolo convinced the Genovese
family, which had been threatening Newton," 8 to cease the threats. 119
The FBI tapes also establish that when Newton's friend and busi-
ness advisor, Mark Moreno, became the recipient of threats, he sought
help from Newton, who in turn introduced Moreno to Penosi.' 2I Penosi
had Newton call Piccolo personally and tell him that Moreno was "with"
Newton as part of his team.' 2 ' As a result, Piccolo again met with the
Genoveses, who agreed to withdraw the threats in exchange for
$3,500. 122
Piccolo then sought to gain from his efforts in resolving Newton's
problems. 2 3 The FBI's tapes of phone conversations between Penosi
and Piccolo contain references to the mob's desire to "earn" from
Newton, including Piccolo's specific interest in the Aladdin. 124 One ex-
ample in the record shows that Piccolo introduced Moreno to an insur-
ance agent and persuaded Moreno to buy a life insurance policy from
him for Newton's friend, Lola Falana, a Las Vegas entertainer managed
by Moreno. 2 About this time, 26 NBC journalists Brian Ross and Ira
115. Id
116. Id.
117. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 26.
118. The circumstances which prompted the Genovese family to threaten Newton were
irrelevant to alleged actual malice of NBC and will not be discussed in this Casenote.
119. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 26.
120. Id at 27-28.
121. Id at 28 n.22 and accompanying text.
122. Id at 28.
123. Id. at 29 n.23 and accompanying text.
124. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 29 n.23 and accompanying text.
125. Id. at 29.
126. July 1980. Id. at 29.
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Silverman learned of the FBI's phone taps and other investigations into
the possible correlation between Newton's desired purchase of the Alad-
din and his communications to high-level Mafia figures.'27 As a result of
their discovery, the journalists decided to inquire further.'28
b. Newton's Testimony Before Nevada State Gaming Authorities
Nevada law requires approval both from the state Gaming Board
and the state Gaming Commission to grant a license to own and operate
a casino. 1 29 Consequently, during the summer months of 1980, Nevada
gaming authorities began a routine investigation of Newton in response
to his application to own and operate the Aladdin. 3 ° On numerous oc-
casions in July and August 1980, Newton gave sworn testimony in inter-
views with a group of Nevada Gaming Board investigators led by Fred
Balmer.' 3 The tape of the August 27, 1980 interview was admitted into
evidence in the trial.' 32 The tape shows Balmer telling Newton of
Penosi's criminal involvement. 133 In reply to specific questions about his
relationship with Penosi, Newton said that he had first met Penosi in the
early 1960s and that the two had had some contact over the past six
months after Newton had received threatening phone calls.'34 Later in
the interview, the investigators informed Newton that after his recent
phone contact with Penosi, Penosi "made contact with an individual who
is from back East in the New England States... Piccolo, who is heavily
involved with organized crime," and that Penosi went "to the Las Vegas
area and our information is he did take care of these individuals [who
had made the threats] for you.' 3 Newton's response - "Well, if it did
happen, ah, I don't know who that is and I'm still getting threats as of
last week"' 36 - clearly contradicted Newton's trial testimony, which
stated that the threats had ended. 137 The Gaming Board, however, even
at the conclusion of its interview with Newton, remained unaware of
127. Id. at 29-30.
128. Id. at 30.
129. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 40.
130. Id at 30.
131. Id
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 31.
135. Id. at 32.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 32 n.26. Part of Newton's response at trial to questions asking why he had not
told Balmer that he had spoken with any individual at Penosi's request was as follows:
Q. When Mr. Balmer said to you, Mr. Newton, that after you did contact Mr.
Penosi he made contact with an individual who was back east in the New England
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Penosi visiting Newton's house, of any meetings between Penosi and
Newton after the cessation of threats against Newton, and of Newton
speaking with Piccolo or anyone else at Penosi's request in an attempt to
stop the threats.
138
Meanwhile, NBC journalists Ross and Silverman continued to ac-
quire their own information, and their findings led to an important con-
flict in the trial testimony. Ross testified that he had learned from a
knowledgeable, confidential source 139 that the New York Police Depart-
ment ("NYPD") had discovered that Piccolo declined an offer to join
some associates in Atlantic City mob rackets because he had resolved a
problem for Wayne Newton and was going to receive some sort of inter-
est in the Aladdin Hotel.14° Newton, however, offered the testimony of
states, did you tell him that, in fact, you had called someone in the New England
states -
A. No, sir, I didn't.
Q. - at the request of Mr. Penosi?
A. No, sir, I didn't. I didn't know where I called.
Q. You dialed an area code, Mr. Newton?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You had no idea what part of the country the area code was in?
A. No sir.
Q. And when Mr. Balmer said to you, Mr. Penosi made contact with an indi-
vidual who was from back east in the New England states, "Piccolo" he called him,
who was heavily involved with organized crime, why didn't you tell him that you had
made two calls at Mr. Penosi's explicit request to someone else to help solve your
problem?
A. It didn't occur to me....
138. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 33.
139. Id. at 33 n.27. In his testimony Ross attested to the source's reliability on two counts:
(1) both he and Silverman had worked with this source before and since, and the source had
proven to be very knowledgeable; and (2) other information that NBC received tended to
confirm what it was being told by the source. When asked why the corroboration mattered,
Ross stated that "It matters because nothing stuck out as a red flag, nothing suggested that
[the source's information] was wrong." Id.
140. Id In his deposition of September 3, 1982, Ross stated that:
for more than a year the FBI had been investigating Frank Piccolo with other mem-
bers of the Gambino Mafia family. On at least one occasion Mr. Piccolo was over-
heard to be in a conversation with other mobsters in which he was asked whether he
would be interested in Atlantic City in supposed mob rackets down there.
He said, no, he was involved with Wayne Newton in Las Vegas and he was
going to be in the Aladdin, unquote.
When read the preceding deposition transcript at trial, Ross testified as follows:
Q. Did you so testify?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And was the testimony truthful?
A. Yes it was....
Q. Were you certain in your mind, when the broadcast was broadcast on Octo-
ber 6, 1980, that you had been told by a reliable source that Frank Piccolo had told
associates that he had taken care of Newton's problem and had become a partner in
the Aladdin Hotel deal?
A. I was certain of that. No doubt in my mind.
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two NYPD officers who claimed that according to department records,
the NYPD had not acquired any such knowledge.141 Yet cross-examina-
tion of one of the officers established that in spite of department rules
which prohibit members from supplying reporters with restricted mate-
rial, NBC's journalists conceivably did obtain some information from the
NYPD.'42 Moreover, the second officer testified that he assumed that
NYPD members leak information to the press without department
permission. 1
43
Silverman testified that he had a confidential source inside the fed-
eral government, who told him that Piccolo and Penosi considered
Newton to be a "mob asset" in Las Vegas.'" In addition, "Source B," as
Silverman called him, claimed that Piccolo and Penosi were trying to
profit from their relationship with Newton.' 4 Silverman further testified
that Source B told him that Newton had not told Nevada gaming author-
ities the entire story surrounding his relationship with Penosi.
46
On September 25, 1980, Ross and Silverman attended a Nevada
Gaming Board public hearing on Newton's application for a license to
purchase the Aladdin. Again under oath, Newton acknowledged meet-
ing Penosi while in his teens but testified falsely that Penosi had never
visited his home in Las Vegas,' 47 adding that "[i]n the approximately 21
years from the time I met him, I might have seen this man four times
Id at 33 n.27 (emphasis added).
141. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 34 n.28 and accompanying text.
142. Id
143. Id.
144. Id at 36.
145. Id
146. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 36 n.29 and accompanying text.
147. Id. at 37 n.30 and accompanying text. Asked by a Gaming Board member if Penosi
had "ever visited you in your home," Newton replied, "No, sir." Id. At trial Newton ex-
plained this false testimony as follows:
Q. Mr. Newton, that was not true, was it?
A. No, sir, not in the context in which you are stating it. It was true in the
context in which I interpreted the question.
Q. Mr. Penosi had come to your house, had he not?
A. I sent a car for him, yes, sir.
Q. Mr. Penosi talked with you at your home?
A. I assume we talked, yes, sir.
Q. He stayed at your home for 20, 25, 30 minutes, I think you said?
A. Approximately 15, 30 minutes, somewhere in there.
Q. He went away from your home in the car that you had provided him.
A. I didn't provide him a car. I provided him a ride. I believe I had someone
pick him up and take him back.
Q. You believe you told the whole story when you responded to the question
has he ever visited you in your home and you said no, sir?
A. In the context in which I understood the question, yes, sir.
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Newton also testified falsely before the Gaming Board about his re-
lationship with his manager, Mark Moreno. He claimed that Moreno
was only a friend, and in reply to a question whether Moreno was "a
representative of [his] in any way, shape or form," Newton answered that
the two had "[n]o association whatsoever." 14 9 The falsity of Newton's
testimony before the Gaming Board became apparent when Moreno tes-
tified at trial that among other things, he had organized business meet-
ings for Newton regarding the purchase of the Aladdin, searched for
possible business partners for Newton, and wrote the contract which
would enable Newton to become the Aladdin's executive director of
entertainment. 150
The Gaming Board, of course, only knew what it elicited from
Newton at its interviews and at the hearing. Upon learning that the Val-
ley Bank of Nevada was providing Newton with financing which would
enable him to buy a fifty percent interest in the Aladdin while commit-
ting him to perform there at least 20 to 26 weeks a year, the Board ad-
journed the hearing by recommending that Newton be licensed.15" '
Immediately following the hearing, Ross attempted to interview
Newton. In his answer to a Ross question, Newton falsely stated that he
had last spoken with Penosi "maybe a year ago" and that Penosi had not
called him.' 52 Ross pursued Newton from the building where the Gam-
ing Board had convened to Newton's car in the parking lot."5 3 When he
asked Newton whether Penosi went to Las Vegas to provide protection
for Newton during the death-threat episode, Frank Fahrenkopf,
Newton's attorney at the time, only said "[c]ome on, that's silly."' '54
On September 26, 1980, the day after the Gaming Board had recom-
mended that Newton be licensed, Nevada's Gaming Commission held a
hearing, approved the Board's recommendation, and granted Newton his
148. Id at 37.
149. Id. at 38 (quoting from the transcript of the public hearing before the Nevada Gaming
Board, Sept. 25, 1980. Newton explained at trial that he understood the question from the
Gaming board asking him if Moreno was a "representative of [his] in any way, shape or form"
to ask instead if he had a "contractual arrangement" with Moreno. Id. at 38 n. 31.
150. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 38 n.32 and accompanying text.
151. Id. at 39.
152. Id. at 39 n.33 and accompanying text. At trial, Newton testified about his response to
Ross regarding when he had last spoken with Penosi as follows:
Q. Was that true, Mr. Newton?
A. No, it wasn't. But I didn't realize I was under oath to Mr. Wimp [Brian
Ross] over there.
Id. at 39 n.33.
153. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 39.
154. Id.
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license to own and operate the Aladdin.I55 At the hearing, Newton sub-
mitted an affidavit to supplement his testimony before the Gaming Board
concerning Penosi.' 56 In the affidavit, Newton declared that he had seen
Penosi only once in the past 13 years - when Penosi had visited Las
Vegas - but conceded that he had appeared on a television program
produced by Penosi's son.' 57 Significantly, the affidavit failed to disclose
Penosi's visit to Newton's home as well as the calls to and conversations
with Penosi during the death-threat episode.' 58
In preparing for the October 6 broadcast, Ross and Silverman inter-
viewed some additional sources. On September 26, 1980, the same day
that the Gaming Commission licensed Newton to purchase the Aladdin,
the journalists met with Johnny Carson, a Los Angeles talk-show host
whose earlier bid for the Aladdin had been unsuccessful.' 59 In question-
ing Carson about his negotiations for the Aladdin, the reporters men-
tioned Penosi's name, but Carson maintained that he had never heard of
Penosi and could not provide any information about him." ° Ross and
Silverman also talked to Mark Moreno about Moreno's and Newton's
possible ties with Penosi and Piccolo. 16' Moreno testified, and Ross
agreed, that Moreno told Ross that the contacts between Penosi and
Newton had nothing to do with the Aladdin, but concerned death threats
against Newton and his family. ' 62 Silverman added that Moreno blamed
local Las Vegas hoods for the death threats against Newton. 63 Moreno
also testified that he told the newsmen that Penosi's involvement in halt-
ing the threats against Newton would be disclosed in an affidavit being
prepared by Fahrenkopf.' 6 The affidavit, as previously discussed, 65 did
not mention any threats. 66
The journalists also wanted to interview Newton, yet the testimony
differs as the strength of their efforts to schedule the interview prior to
the October 6 broadcast. Ross and Silverman contend that they continu-
ally sought and were denied permission to interview Newton.
67
155. Id. at 40.
156. Id.
157. Id
158. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 40.
159. Id. at 40-41.
160. Id. at 41 n.34 and accompanying text.
161. Id. at 42.
162. Id.
163. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 42.
164. Id.
165. See supra notes 156-158 and accompanying text.
166. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 42.
167. Id. at 43.
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Newton, however, testified that he was unaware of NBC's desire to inter-
view him about Penosi.' 6 Nevertheless, Ross and Silverman clearly
made some attempts to interview Newton and that Newton rejected them
at least once.' 69 The testimony of Newton and his secretary, Mona
Matoba, for instance, show that when Silverman called to request an in-
terview, Newton directed Matoba to ascertain what kind of story they
wanted to do.' 7 ° When Matoba said that the journalist wanted to ask
Newton about the Aladdin and Guido Penosi, 7' Newton told her to de-
cline the interview. 72 In addition, the journalists asked Ramon Hervey,
a public relations executive who knew Moreno, to help them arrange an
interview with Newton. 17 3 Hervey testified that Silverman told him that
Newton was a "hard guy to get to and [that] I really would like to talk to
him, just for a few minutes."' 174 Moreover, Hervey asserted that
Silverman was persistent in trying to enlist his assistance in getting an
interview with Newton.'
75
The Ninth Circuit ultimately found that the majority of the facts
reported by NBC in the October 6, 1980 broadcast were uncontro-
verted.176 Newton had gone to Penosi with a problem. Penosi, who was
being investigated by federal authorities for his involvement in mob rack-
ets, called Piccolo, a reputed mob boss, who helped solve the problem.
Piccolo and Penosi later discussed "earning off" Newton, and there is
evidence to suggest their interest in profiting from Newton's ownership
in the Aladdin Hotel and Casino.
2. Examining the Error of the District Court Analysis
The district court upheld the jury's liability verdict because of the
"clear and inescapable impression" that since Newton lacked the money
to buy the Aladdin Hotel, he called Penosi, a friend who had ties to
organized crime, and that in exchange for helping Newton raise the
money, Penosi acquired a hidden interest in the Aladdin Hotel. 7 7 The
district court judged that this impression was conveyed with actual mal-
ice and advanced two arguments in support of its ruling. First, the court
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 43.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 43 n.36.
175. Id.
176. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 44.
177. See Newton, 677 F. Supp. at 1067.
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reasoned that NBC "should have ... foreseen" that the broadcast would
leave the impression that the mob had financed Newton's purchase of the
Aladdin, regardless of whether NBC had intended to leave that impres-
sion. 78 The district court added that NBC's failure to anticipate this
possible impression of the broadcast revealed a reckless disregard for the
truth. 79 Second, the lower court concluded that NBC had edited and
combined the audio and visual portions of the broadcast in a way that
created the defamatory impressions. 8 0 Since those impressions were
"clear and inescapable," the district court found that the jury could
properly discredit and reject the testimony of the NBC journalists that
they had not intended to leave a false impression.'' Both of these rul-
ings contradict the principles espoused in New York Times and Bose.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the district court misconstrued the
law in holding that "an interpretation of the broadcast that should have
been foreseen by the journalists [could] give rise to liability."'8 2 The dis-
trict court's gauge of what should have been foreseen is an objective neg-
ligence test, and differs significantly from the deliberately subjective
actual malice test of New York Times. ' 3 The impact of this distinction is
that negligence, based upon an objective standard like the one used by
the district court, can never engender liability in a public figure defama-
tion case. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a reck-
less disregard for the truth "requires more than a departure from
reasonably prudent conduct. "1I Consequently, the district court erred in
grounding liability on an objective standard.
In addition, the district court incorrectly held that the jury could
have based a finding of actual malice upon its determination that the
journalists' testimony about their state of mind was not credible.' The
Supreme Court has ruled that "when the testimony of a witness is not
believed, the trier of fact may simply disregard it."'8 6 Nonetheless, the
Court added that discredited testimony alone does not provide sufficient
grounds for drawing a contrary conclusion. 18 7  Furthermore, the
178. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 47. See also Newton, 677 F. Supp. at 1068.
179. Id.
180. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 47. See also Newton 677 F. Supp. at 1067-
68.
181. Id.
182. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 47 (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 47-48. See generally Harte-Hanks, 109 S. Ct. at 2696.
184. Harte-Hanks, 109 S. Ct. at 2696 (emphasis added). See generally supra text accompa-
nying notes 17-22.
185. Newton 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 48.
186. Id.
187. Bose, 466 U.S. at 512. See also Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 268-69 (2d Cir.
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Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the district court in Bose,'88
which had found that the author of a magazine article about stereo sys-
tems had lied in testifying that the words he had used in the article meant
something other than what the court interpreted them to mean. 189 The
district court in Bose had "reasoned that since [the author of the article]
did know what he had heard, and he knew that the meaning of the lan-
guage employed did not accurately reflect what he heard, he must have
realized the statement was inaccurate at the time he wrote it."' 19  The
district court's understanding of the author's language, however, was
only
"one of a number of possible rational interpretations". .. [and]
[t]he choice of such language, though reflecting a misconcep-
tion, does not place the speech beyond the outer limits of the
first amendment's broad protective umbrella. Under the Dis-
trict Court's analysis, any individual using a malapropism
might be liable, simply because an intelligent speaker would
have to know that the term was inaccurate in context, even
though he did not realize his folly at the time.191
As Bose illustrated and as Harte-Hanks reaffirmed, 192 actual malice
does not result from a finding that an "intelligent speaker"' 193 failed to
depict the words he used as the finder of fact did.194 Accordingly, no
court could have properly upheld the jury's verdict in Newton because
the verdict was based on a legally unsupportable inference. The jury
found that since the NBC journalists were trained professionals, and
since the broadcast was capable of painting a libelous portrayal of
Newton, NBC therefore must have intended to impart the defamatory
impression Newton claims.'95 Nevertheless, the district court in Newton
tried to justify its ruling upon that same basis: since the court found the
impression from the broadcast to be "clear and inescapable," it held that
the jury correctly found that NBC intended to pass on that
1952), which held that a plaintiff could not meet his burden of proving that a defamatory
statement had been made by showing that the jury disbelieved those who denied making it.
Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 48 n.39.
188. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
189. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 49.
190. Id. at 50 (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 512). See also supra text accompanying notes 38-
43.
191. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 50-51 (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 512-13
(quoting Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290 (1971))).
192. See Harte-Hanks, 109 S. Ct. at 2696 n.35.
193. Bose, 466 U.S. at 511.
194. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 51.
195. Id.
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impression.'96
The Ninth Circuit asserted that the lower court's "approach eviscer-
ates the first amendment protections established by New York Times. It
would permit liability to be imposed not only for what was not said but
also for what was not intended to be said."'I9 7 Thus, the court of appeals
held that the district court erred by substituting the jury's opinion of the
broadcast's impression for that of the journalists who prepared the
broadcast. 9 This substitution impermissibly gave the jury an expanded
role.' 99
3. The Independent Review of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
As compelled by New York Times, the Ninth Circuit concluded its
review by examining the evidentiary record and conducting its own anal-
ysis to determine if it provided a clear and convincing basis for the jury's
finding of actual malice. Newton brought forth the following six basic
arguments in an attempt to expose NBC's actual malice, yet in each in-
stance, the court of appeals dismissed Newton's assertion for failing to
sustain the level of proof New York Times requires. Ultimately, the
Ninth Circuit's assessment of the testimony and of the circumstantial
and documentary evidence failed to reveal evidence of actual malice,
much less clear and convincing proof of the same. As a result, the appel-
late court reversed the lower court's ruling against NBC and dismissed
the complaint.
a. Failure to Mention the Death Threats
Newton observed that the October 6, 1980 broadcast failed to men-
tion that Newton's calls to Penosi and Piccolo came about because of the
death threats he had been receiving, and he argued that this absence
evinces actual malice. 200 Newton reasoned that in explaining his contact
with Penosi, the death threats provide an alternative to any financial
trouble he may have experienced in acquiring the Aladdin. 20 ' NBC, on
the other hand, contended that Newton's argument was irrelevant be-
cause the broadcast would have been no less defamatory if NBC had
explicitly declared that Newton gave the Mafia an interest in the Aladdin
in exchange for ending the death threats. The defamatory impact of the
196. Id. at 51-52.
197. Id. at 52.
198. Id.
199. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 52.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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fact that Newton received help from mobsters who were planning to
"earn off" his ownership in the Aladdin would remain the same regard-
less of the details about the nature of the help the Mafia provided.2 "2
The Ninth Circuit averred that although NBC correctly maintained
that the Mafia had done Newton a favor, NBC's argument was inconse-
quential, the circumstances which induced the mob's intervention
notwithstanding.20 3 In assessing the question of actual malice, the funda-
mental inquiry is the journalist's state of mind and whether he "realized
that his statement was false or that he subjectively entertained serious
doubt as to the truth of the statement.
' 2
0
4
The NBC journalists testified that they lacked enough credible evi-
dence to broadcast on October 6 that threats had been made. 2 5 NBC's
primary source of the information that the "problem" the Mafia had
solved for Newton involved threats against his life was Moreno, whose
story the journalists found questionable. 2' Newton claimed that the re-
porters knew he called the mob with a "security problem," not a finan-
cial one, based on his belief that NBC should have deemed Moreno a
credible witness.20 More specifically, Newton insisted that since the
journalists testified that they found Moreno an unreliable source, the jury
had to conclude that the journalists were lying.
208
The Ninth Circuit described Newton's argument as "convo-
luted,' ' 2 ' and explained that New York Times shields journalists from
liability for factual mistakes resulting from the journalists' reliance upon
a credible source. 210 As the Supreme Court held in St. Amant,21 1 as long
as a journalist has made some effort to verify his or her information, the
journalist will not be guilty of actual malice, even when the journalist
used a source with unknown reliability.21 2 St. Amant suggested that
"reckless disregard for truth could be predicated on reliance 'wholly on
an unverified anonymous telephone call,' but found that when the pub-
lisher had not deemed the source to be 'unsatisfactory,' and had verified
202. Id. at 52-53.
203. Id at 53.
204. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 53 (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 511 n.30).
205. Id at 53-54. NBC said it did have sufficient credible evidence to mention the threats in
subsequent broadcasts. Id.
206. Id. at 54.
207. Id.
208. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 54.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 55.
211. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
212. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 55.
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aspects of the information, there was no reckless disregard." '213
Moreover, the court observed that a journalist's evaluation of a
source intrinsically involves essential free speech values.21 4 Conse-
quently, the court determined that the utility in safeguarding a journal-
ist's ability to gather material through various methods mandates the
application of a more scrutinizing first amendment standard of review. 1 5
The court noted that the reliability of a source relates directly to the
conditions under which a journalist writes a story.2" 6 Accordingly, the
court ruled that the import in allowing reporters "to interview diverse
sources, pursue multiple story lines, and draw their honest and profes-
sional conclusions from their research dictates that the media should not
fear that its journalists' professional judgments will be second-guessed by
juries without the benefit of careful appellate review. "217
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the uncontroverted evidence es-
tablished that the NBC journalists were not reckless in rejecting as in-
credible Moreno's details about the threats. 21  The journalists testified
that they were uneasy about Moreno based on their understanding of
Moreno's possible connection to the Mafia.2 9  They further doubted
Moreno's credibility because of his claimed involvement with Newton's
purchase of the Aladdin, especially after Newton himself denied any as-
sociation with Moreno.22° In addition, Moreno's reliability suffered
when his statement to the journalists that Newton's affidavit would clar-
ify the extent of Newton's relationship with Penosi failed to include such
information.22' Lastly, while accompanying Newton after the Gaming
Board hearing, 222 Fahrenkopf, who possessed a spotless reputation in the
community as well as with NBC, expressly refuted that Penosi had pro-
213. Id (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732-33).
214. Id. at 55-56. See also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1557 (9th
Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
215. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 56-57.
216. Id. at 56.
217. Id. at 56-57.
218. Id. at 58.
219. Id.
220. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 58-59. The court points out that although
this response by Newton was false, it does not mean that the journalists had reason to believe
that Moreno, rather than Newton, was lying. "The actual malice inquiry looks at circumstan-
tial evidence of what the journalists knew rather than at circumstantial evidence of what
turned out to be correct." Id. at 59 n.41 (emphasis added). See also supra note 149 and
accompanying text.
221. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 59. See also supra text accompanying notes
156-158.
222. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 59.
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tected Newton from threats.223
Irrespective of whether the jury believed the journalists about their
states of mind as to the possibility of alluding to the threats in the Octo-
ber 6 broadcast, the apparent inconsistencies between Moreno's informa-
tion and the information gleaned from Newton and his agents negated a
finding of reckless disregard for the truth.2 2 4 Newton could not blame
the journalists for believing his own statements, and as the court noted,
"'it would be ironical [sic] and certainly inequitable for [Newton] to
profit ... from his own misstatements.' ",225 As a result, the court held
that NBC's failure to mention the threats in the October 6 broadcast did
not manifest clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.
b. Reference to Newton's Financial Problems
Newton claimed that the statement on the October 6 broadcast that
"[d]espite his big income, authorities say Newton has had financial
problems" indicated that NBC sought to strengthen the idea that the
Mafia had a hidden share in the Aladdin and thereby intentionally tried
to defame Newton. 226 Newton discovered that an early sketch of the
broadcast referred to his financial problems as "serious," and he alleged
that use of this term displayed that NBC wanted to exaggerate his finan-
cial status to bolster the notion that he had contacted the mob for finan-
cial assistance in his purchase of the Aladdin.227  Newton further
submitted that NBC's omission of the word "serious" from the show's
transcript demonstrated clear and convincing proof of actual malice. 228
The court disposed of this argument for various reasons. First, the
statement was true: authorities had said that Newton had financial
problems, and thus, the court could not support a finding of actual mal-
ice. 229 The testimony of Nevada Gaming Board member Glen Mauldin
attested that the Board was in fact distressed about Newton's financial
health, particularly his ability to purchase and operate the Aladdin.210
The Board's investigation revealed that prior to buying the Aladdin,
Newton was averaging a $75,000 delinquency in his monthly obligations,
and that acquiring the Aladdin would increase his monthly responsibili-
223. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 154.
224. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 59.
225. Id. (quoting Friedman v. Boston Broadcasters, Inc., 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1742,
1744 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 402 Mass. 376, 522 N.E.2d 959 (1988)).
226. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 60 n.42 and accompanying text.
227. Id. at 60-61.
228. Id. at 61.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 62 n.43 and accompanying text.
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ties by $85,000.23 Second, the evidence disclosed that the death threats
against Newton were precipitated by Newton's dispute with a low-level
mobster over an amount in the neighborhood of $20,000.232 The court of
appeals observed that $20,000 represents a significant amount of money
and that a debt to a mobster which leads to death threats represents a
"serious problem." '233 Finally, the court rejected Newton's allegation
about the removal of the word "serious," explaining that "[e]diting to
make a broadcast more understated and cautious cannot possibly be
grounds for actual malice.
'" 234
c. Existence of a Hidden Partner
Newton contended that since Ross and Silverman had attended the
September 25, 1980 hearing of the Gaming Board and heard testimony
that Valley Bank of Nevada was providing Newton with the Aladdin
financing, NBC's false statement that "Piccolo told associates that he...
had become a hidden partner in the Aladdin' 2 35 evidenced actual mal-
236ice. In other words, the knowledge that Valley Bank was funding the
Aladdin deal should have eliminated the possibility that Newton could
have a hidden partner.
The court easily dismissed this contention with the testimony of
Newton's own organized crime expert, Professor Robert Blakely, who
bluntly stated that Valley Bank's providing money for Newton's Aladdin
purchase "did not answer the question of whether any hidden interest
existed. '237 Blakely testified that a hidden interest in a casino is not sy-
nonymous with actual ownership but represents an interest in the "skim"
- the amount of casino receipts not reported to the appropriate authori-
ties as receipts.238 Neither corporate documents nor materials available
for public review would reflect such an interest.239 Consequently, even
though the journalists knew about Valley Bank's financing, that informa-
tion proved to be unhelpful in demonstrating that NBC exhibited actual
malice in conveying that the Mafia had acquired a hidden interest in the
Aladdin.24°
231. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 61-62.
232. Id. at 63.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
236. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 64.
237. Id. at 64-65.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 65.
240. Id.
[Vol. I11
FIRST AMENDMENT
d. Ambiguous Wording and Editing
Newton complained that certain language choices and editing deci-
sions manifested actual malice on the part of NBC. In one example,
Newton charges that NBC should have included the words "if any" or
"possible" in describing Penosi's role in the sentence "[a] federal grand
jury is investigating the role of Guido Penosi and the mob in Newton's
deal for the Aladdin." 24 ' The court had to reject this criticism on the
foundation that complaints or disagreements over language choices are
editorial decisions that do not precipitate liability.242 Furthermore, "the
first amendment cautions courts against intruding too closely into ques-
tions of editorial judgment, such as choice of specific words. ,243 At worst,
the court said that the sentence at issue was "slightly ambiguous," ad-
ding that it "does not mislead listeners about the nature of the federal
[investigation]." 2" Nonetheless, the court followed Ninth Circuit prece-
dent which precludes liability in public figure defamation cases upon the
use of ambiguous language.245
The court also rejected Newton's complaints about two other NBC
editing decisions. First, it discarded Newton's problem with NBC's
omission of the second part of Newton's response to the question posed
to him at the Gaming Board hearing: "Are you planning to continue any
relationship with Mr. Penosi?" The program contained the first part of
Newton's answer - "Well, on the basis of which I've known him, I don't
think there's been a relationship" - but not the second part, "The direct
answer to your question is obviously no if he has those kind [sic] of con-
nections." '246 The court also dismissed Newton's protest concerning the
broadcast's depiction of his angry response to Ross's questions after the
Gaming Board hearing.247 Newton contended that the broadcast had
failed to show the earlier segment of the attempted interview which, ac-
cording to Newton, prompted his anger.248 The court conceded that
although the broadcast did not depict Newton in complimentary
terms,24 9 the challenged material represented a true illustration of
241. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 65.
242. Id. at 65-66.
243. Id. at 66 (quoting Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc. 788 F.2d 1300, 1304 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986)).
244. Id. at 66 n.44 and accompanying text.
245. Id. at 66. See also Masson, 895 F.2d at 1544-45.
246. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 67. See id. at 37 for a relevant excerpt of
Newton's trial testimony.
247. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 67. See also supra text accompanying notes
153-154.
248. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 67.
249. Id.
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Newton's demeanor during the Board's investigation and was therefore
pertinent to NBC's report.
250
e. NBC's Lack of Effort to Interview Newton
Newton also argued that the journalists did not make a sufficient
attempt to interview him, and that the absence of a more spirited effort
manifested that the journalists did not care to hear Newton's side of the
story. 25 ' Although the Supreme Court has held that purposeful avoid-
ance of the truth could evince actual malice,252 the evidence showed that
Ross and Silverman tried on at least two occasions to interview Newton
and that Ross did actually interview him once.2 53 Moreover, nothing in
the record exhibited that the journalists deliberately tried to avoid the
truth in preparation for the October 6 broadcast.
254
f Overall Impression of Television
Finally, Newton insisted that "television allows the media to inter-
pose sound and pictures over words and to manipulate the impressions it
creates. '255 Accordingly, Newton asserted that an average viewer, who
watches a television broadcast once, does not have the opportunity to
analyze each word with the precision necessary to understand its in-
tended meaning.256 Thus, a viewer can only infer the "overall impres-
sion" of a broadcast. 257 As a result, Newton maintained that the court
should have avoided a word-by-word examination of the broadcast be-
cause the overall impression of television depends upon images, not
words.258
In the first place, the court pointed out that Newton had earlier re-
quested the "careful parsing" which he was now condemning. 259 Addi-
tionally, the court found Newton to have misunderstood that the purpose
of appellate review in a first amendment case is to determine whether
supposedly maligning speech falls within the sheltering penumbra of that
amendment. 2 ' To have abided by Newton's recommendation would
250. Id.
251. Id. at 68.
252. Id. (quoting Harte-Hanks, 109 S. Ct. at 2698).
253. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 68.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 68-69.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 69.
258. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 69.
259. Id. at 69 n.45. See also supra text accompanying notes 226-228.
260. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 69.
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have required that the court relinquish its constitutional duty: analyzing
a telecast with less scrutiny since one-time viewers can only perceive gen-
eral images spurns the constitutional values defended by the rule of in-
dependent judicial review.26'
V. CONCLUSION
The constitutional protection for the press embodied in the first
amendment represents part of "a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."
262
In agreement with this commitment, the Supreme Court, in New York
Times, precluded a public official from collecting damages for a defama-
tory statement about his official conduct unless he could prove that the
statement was made with actual malice.263 In doing so, the Court fur-
nished the media with a valuable privilege by shielding journalists from
liability for factual mistakes resulting from the journalists' reliance upon
a credible source. 26" In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 2 65 the Court ex-
tended the privilege to protect defamatory criticism of non-official public
figures whose fame and notoriety necessarily subjects them to public
scrutiny. 266 Since Wayne Newton clearly fit the description of a public
figure,267 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Newton correctly applied
the New York Times standard in reversing the decision of the District
Court.
A. NBC's October 6 Broadcast
Upon discovering that the FBI was looking into the connection be-
tween Newton's desired purchase of the Aladdin and his telephone con-
versations with renowned mobsters, NBC's Ross and Silverman initiated
261. Id at 69-70.
262. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
263. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
264. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 55. See also Gertz 418 U.S. at 336-337
(quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concur-
ring)); Harte-Hanks, 109 S. Ct. at 2682, 2696; St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731; and text accompa-
nying supra note 51.
265. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See supra text accompanying note 16.
266. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring).
267. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 11 n.6. See also text accompanying supra
note 92.
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their own investigation. 268 After a four month inquiry, the journalists
aired their findings on October 6. Based on the information they had
discovered, the journalists clearly lacked the actual malice necessary to
subject them to liability.
2 69
Ross learned from a trusted source that the New York Police De-
partment had discovered that mob boss Piccolo was to get an interest in
the Aladdin Hotel, apparently in exchange for having settled a problem
for Newton.270 Silverman ascertained from a source inside in the federal
government that Piccolo and Penosi were attempting to profit from their
relationship with "mob asset" Newton, who in turn had withheld from
Nevada gaming authorities pertinent details about his relationship with
Penosi.27'
At the September 25 public hearing, the journalists heard Newton
testify that he had seen Penosi only four times in the past twenty-one
years.27 2 In addition, while still under oath Newton denied having any
business relationship with Moreno, stating that the two were merely
friends. 27 ' After the hearing, when Ross asked Newton whether Penosi
had gone to Las Vegas to protect Newton from death threats, Newton's
attorney, Fahrenkopf, responded in Newton's presence, "[c]ome on,
that's silly" 274 - a negative and flippant reply which essentially told
Ross to dismiss the death-threat angle altogether. Finally, the journal-
ists' interview with Moreno was discredited when the affidavit Newton
submitted to the Nevada Gaming Commission on October 26 failed to
disclose details about Penosi's involvement in stopping the threats
against Newton.275
Not a single detail of the October 6 broadcast is unsupported by the
preceding facts.276 Ross and Silverman attempted to verify the informa-
tion they acquired, and where verification of a fact was not possible, that
fact was omitted from the story.27 7 They did not broadcast anything
268. See Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 29-30 and supra text accompanying notes
126-128.
269. See Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 54, 68.
270. See id. at 33 n.27. See also supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
271. See Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 36 & n.29.
272. See supra text accompanying note 148.
273. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
274. Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 39.
275. Id. at 40, 59.
276. Id. at 44.
277. See id. at 53-54, 58-60. See also Response of Defendants/Appellants to Petition for
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265
(Nos. 89-55220, 89-55285).
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which they believed was false or probably false, and as a result, neither
NBC nor the journalists were liable for defaming Wayne Newton.
B. The Appellate Court's Decision
Above all else, the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Newton indicates that
the judiciary reveres the guarantees of the first amendment as the Consti-
tution's most sacred promise. Despite the plain intent of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a) that jury findings shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous,27 the Ninth Circuit found that defamation cases pose
a danger to first amendment protections which transcends the fact-
finder's role.279 In particular, the court ruled it necessary to shield first
amendment values from the biased Las Vegas jury.2s° Newton was and
still is so adored by Las Vegas denizens that the Ninth Circuit feared that
the jury would ignore first amendment protections and unfairly disad-
vantage NBC.28" ' In its independent review of the trial record, the Ninth
Circuit uncovered evidence which justified its fears.
Not only did the court establish that NBC had broadcast its story
without actual malice, but the court also suggested that because of
Newton's evasive and manipulative testimony, he was not deserving of
any jury award whatsoever. Throughout its opinion, the Ninth Circuit
describes instances of perjurious conduct on the part of Newton. On at
least two different occasions, Newton's trial testimony regarding his rela-
tionship with Penosi directly contradicts statements he made to the Ne-
vada Gaming Board while under oath.282 Furthermore, the testimony of
Newton's secretary, Matoba,283 that Newton declined to be interviewed
about Penosi and the Aladdin is highly suggestive of bad faith.
Overall, the opinion highlights many instances where Newton
clearly lied while under oath, and thus conveys that Newton may not be
the innocent victim he claimed to be.2 4 The opinion's frequent allusions
to Newton's dishonesty suggest that beyond the legal reasons for revers-
ing the lower court's decision, the Ninth Circuit could have reached a
similar conclusion on principles of justice and equity.
278. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
279. See Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 15-20 and text accompanying supra notes
98-109.
280. See id. 20-21 and text accompanying supra note 110.
281. See id. at 21-22 and text accompanying supra notes 111-12.
282. See id. at 32 & n.26 (description of Newton's false testimony concerning whether the
death threats had ended) and id. at 37 & n.30 (account of Newton's false testimony as to
whether Penosi had ever visited Newton at Newton's .home).
283. See Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 at 43.
284. See Goldner, supra note 64, at 75.
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VI. AFTERWORD
When the Ninth Circuit's decision came down on August 30, 1990,
the opinion received the advance sheet citation of 913 F.2d 652. Yet
before volume 913 of the Federal Reporter, Second Series, was published,
appellee Newton filed a petition for rehearing on September 13.285 On
November 8, the Ninth Circuit ordered the appellants to respond to a
specific portion of appellee's rehearing petition.286 In addition, the court
informed the West Publishing Company ("West") that the Newton opin-
ion should be "held" while the petition for rehearing was being consid-
ered. 87 West subsequently withdrew the opinion from the Federal
Reporter. 288 Nevertheless, the court did not formally withdraw the opin-
ion and, as a result, the opinion still represents official case law.289
On December 12, 1990, Newton filed a reply to NBC's response, 29
and as of February 11, 1991, the parties involved in Newton are awaiting
the court's ruling on this motion.29'
Brian C. Gura*
285. See Appellee's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of the Appropriateness of a Re-
hearing En Banc, Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265, (Nos. 89-55220, 89-55285). The
petition contains Newton's criticism of the Ninth Circuit's decision for misapplying the rele-
vant law and for misconstruing significant evidence. Idl
286. See Order at 2, Newton, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 (No. 89-55220). On November
21, 1990, NBC filed its response with the Ninth Circuit, maintaining that the appellate court
had correctly refuted Newton's unsupported claims. See Response of Defendants/Appellants
to Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 2, n., Newton, 1990 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15265 (Nos. 89-55220, 89-55285).
287. Telephone interview with Bill Araiza, law clerk to Newton opinion author Judge Wil-
liam A. Norris, February 11, 1991.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See Appellee's Motion For Leave to File "Reply of Appellee in Support of Petition for
Rehearing and Suggestion of the Appropriateness of a Rehearing En Banc," Newton, 1990
U.S. App. LEXIS 15265 (Nos. 89-55220, 89-55285). This motion contains Newton's objec-
tions to the arguments employed by NBC in its response to appellee's petition for rehearing
and reiterates many of the claims from that petition. Id.
291. Telephone interview with Bill Araiza, law clerk to Newton opinion author Judge Wil-
liam A. Norris, February 11, 1991.
* The Author wishes to thank Nell O'Donnell for a timely suggestion and Denise for her
love and support.
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